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AGAINST GOALS 
Eleanor M. Fox* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Essay argues that the U.S. debate on the goals of antitrust tends to 
obscure a much more critical and consequential debate.  The Essay begins 
with a historical description of goals; it proceeds to question the question:  
What are the goals?  It then identifies the real debate. 
I.  A LITTLE HISTORY 
There is a backstory about the goals debate.  It is about what the goals of 
U.S. antitrust law were and have been through time. 
U.S. antitrust was born in 1890 out of a concern for the power and 
exploitations of the new, large, and powerful business organizations called 
trusts.  Congress wanted to rein in the power of the trusts, but it did not 
legislate how to do so.  Rather, it deliberately left this task for the courts to 
develop on a case-by-case basis.  As soon as the first antitrust cases reached 
the Supreme Court of the United States, a war of philosophies emerged.  
The first Justice John Marshall Harlan took up the cudgels against powerful 
giants of business.  Justice Edward White, and soon also Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Jr., took up the cudgels freedom of business from 
government regulation.  Much later, Justice William O. Douglas would 
stand in the shoes of Justice Harlan I, and later again, Justice Holmes’s 
skepticism about business power and disdain for intervention to contain it 
would resonate in opinions of Justice Antonin Scalia. 
At various times in the evolution of the antitrust laws, the courts were 
more or less conservative or aggressive.  Judicial conservatism, evidenced, 
for example, in weak law on tying and exclusive dealing, produced the 
Clayton Act of 1914.1 In the 1940s, public alarm that economic 
concentration could play into the hands of another Hitler produced the 
Celler-Kefauver Amendment of 1950,2 strengthening the merger law.  In 
the 1960s, the Supreme Court faithfully applied the intent of Congress as 
 
*  Eleanor M. Fox is Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation at New York 
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 1. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–
27 (2006)). 
 2. Celler-Kefauver Amendment to the Clayton Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006)). 
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expressed in the legislative history that animated the Celler-Kefauver 
Amendment. 
In the mid-1970s, as trade barriers fell, foreign competition surged, and 
international opportunities emerged, the country grew restless under the 
thumb of pervasive prohibitory law.  Moreover, the constituency of the 
Supreme Court changed and the new Justices were more attuned to the 
perspective of Justices Edward White and Holmes than to that of the first 
Justice Harlan.  They were more pro-business, supportive of freedom from 
legal constraints, and trusting that businesses would be driven by the winds 
of competition to follow efficient and competitive paths. 
When Ronald Reagan ran for the Presidency of the United States in 1980, 
he won on a mandate to shrink regulation—to get government off the back 
of business.  His first Assistant Attorney General in Charge of Antitrust 
(AAG) was charged with constructing a reduced paradigm for antitrust, and 
AAG William Baxter fulfilled this charge brilliantly.  In 1980, American 
antitrust law had no “paradigm” in the sense of loss or gain that could be 
calculated.  Antitrust was guided by principles.  It was for diversity and 
access to markets; it was against high concentration and abuses of power.  
Powerful firms were assumed to have incentives to use their power.   
AAG Baxter introduced a new perspective and a paradigm.  He did so 
most powerfully through merger guidelines.3  The perspective was that 
business acts are usually efficient (welfare increasing) and should be 
presumed so.  The paradigm was that mergers and conduct are not 
anticompetitive in the eyes of the antitrust law unless they reduce consumer 
surplus.4  This was revolutionary.  Antitrust analysis had been inductive, 
not deductive, and surely not reductive.  Professor Louis Schwartz, a 
revered antitrust teacher and scholar, wrote that Chicago school had been 
“smuggl[ed]” into antitrust.5 
Why the new paradigm?  The Reagan Antitrust Division had been given 
the charge to cut back antitrust.  What was the surest, cleanest way to cut 
back antitrust dramatically while not denying its existence?  The new 
paradigm fit this bill precisely.  A total welfare paradigm, which would 
count producer gain from exploitation equally with consumer loss, would 
have shrunk the law even more.  But in the early 1980s it was beyond the 
range of credibility; it would not have met the requirement of 
acknowledging the existence of the antitrust laws. 
 
 3. See Eleanor M. Fox, The New Merger Guidelines—A Blueprint for Microeconomic 
Analysis, 27 ANTITRUST BUL. 519 (1982). 
 4. For a treatment of the above history and evolution, see Eleanor M. Fox, The 
Modernization of Antitrust:  A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981).  For a 
brief modern account of the history of U.S. antitrust, see DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. 
ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL:  THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 319–25 
(2012) (depicting American antitrust as a virtuous circle reflecting political and economic 
inclusiveness and accountability). 
 5. Louis B. Schwartz, The New Merger Guidelines:  Guide to Governmental Discretion 
and Private Counseling or Propaganda for Revision of the Antitrust Laws?, 71 CALIF. L. 
REV. 575, 576–77 (1983). 
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From the early 1980s forward, U.S. antitrust law developed under a 
model that is euphemistically called “maximizing consumer welfare.”  But 
in an important sense, this modern goal is not to maximize consumer 
welfare even if consumer surplus is the sole focus.  U.S. antitrust law is not 
designed to make consumers as well off as possible, as Justice Scalia took 
pains to state in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko.6  The operational goal (not accepted by all jurists) is to let business 
be free of antitrust unless its acts will decrease aggregate consumer surplus, 
and then again, unless the acts are a response to the market or a way to 
produce or invent new or better goods or services.  This is not an 
indefensible modus operandi.  In some circumstances it may make sense as 
a guiding light for applications of U.S. antitrust law in this millennium.  But 
it is not the goal of antitrust unless the concept of “goal” reads ninety years 
out of antitrust history. 
II.  WHAT IS THE VITAL QUESTION? 
The typical framing of the debate on the goals of U.S. antitrust law is 
misleading.  The answer to the question, “What are the goals?” is typically 
given in terms of what the respondent—invariably an inside player who has 
already formed a normative view—believes the operational guiding 
principle should be.  Typically, respondents to the question are not trying to 
derive the goals as disinterested students of history and political science but 
to argue for their view of good policy.  This is fine; people should argue for 
what they believe is good policy; but then, should the question be posed 
differently? 
III.  WHAT IS THE DEBATE REALLY ABOUT? 
The debate on goals is a stand-in for a different conversation.  In fact, 
most participants in the American goals debate substantially agree on a vital 
answer to the overarching question:  What do you, and what should we, as a 
country, want from markets and antitrust?7 
Here is the answer, on which there is substantial consensus8:  We want 
our markets to be robust.  We want our businesses to be efficient, effective, 
lithe, inventive, and adaptable to change.  We want an environment that will 
create incentives for businesses to strive the hardest they can in these 
directions.  If businesses successfully do so, they will deliver to buyers and 
ultimate consumers what they need, want, and are able to pay for, including 
 
 6. 540 U.S. 398, 415 (2004). 
 7. Note that no one in the typical American debate among insiders (antitrust lawyers 
and economists) proposes to use antitrust to protect inefficient firms, small business, jobs, 
local suppliers, or national champions. 
 8. Consider all of the essays in this Symposium.  For example, compare John B. 
Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust:  Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from 
Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425 (2013), with Joshua D. Wright & 
Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust:  Welfare Trumps Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2405 (2013). 
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the range of choice they desire; entrepreneurs are likely to have economic 
opportunity; American business is likely to be competitive in the world; the 
economy is likely to be strong and grow; and the people in general are 
likely to be better off. 
Let us call this objective “robust markets,” and let us consider the general 
objective of antitrust to proscribe acts that significantly undermine robust 
markets. 
The question, then, is how to reach the objective of “robust markets” or, 
more precisely, how antitrust can be used to do so.  The core debate is how 
to design and apply antitrust principles so that robust markets are likely to 
result or be preserved, not what are the goals of antitrust. 
There is wide agreement on a second proposition: we do not want to, nor 
could we if we desired, engineer the results.  The answer must lie in 
safeguarding an environment that creates the right incentives, the right mix 
of business freedom, and prohibitory rules and standards. 
At this point, consensus ends.  Experts and stakeholders are divided.  On 
what do they disagree?  On perspective and on assumptions. 
On perspective.  The big choice is between outcome orientation, on the 
one hand, and concern for process as well as outcome, on the other.  Do we 
value the process of rivalry, relatively open access, and contestability of 
markets by entrepreneurs and firms without market power?  Or should we 
limit antitrust condemnation to acts that provably lessen output?  It is not 
true, as charged, that concern with preserving rivalry and access is 
functionally equivalent to protecting inefficient competitors.  Inquiries and 
analysis can assure against protectionism.  One excellent example of this 
core debate can be found in the Chicago sports stadium case.9  Another 
example is the European Union Microsoft interoperability case as compared 
with U.S. law on the strong right to refuse to deal.10 
On assumptions.  The big choice is between embracing or not embracing 
the free-market assumptions apparently favored by a critical mass of current 
Supreme Court Justices:  markets work well; the forces of competition or 
potential competition are strong; businesses act in the interests of 
consumers; government (antitrust) intervention is generally clumsy, 
inefficient, and misinformed; and “free” markets will almost always cure a 
market problem faster and better than antitrust intervention. 
Perspective and assumptions—not goals—make the difference.11 
 
 9. See Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 563–85 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, 
J., dissenting). 
 10. See Eleanor M. Fox, The EC Microsoft Case and Duty to Deal:  The Transatlantic 
Divide, in MICROSOFT ON TRIAL:  LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A 
TRANSATLANTIC ANTITRUST CASE 274 (Luca Rubini ed., 2010).  A stunning difference in 
perspective emerges from comparing Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-
3601, with Trinko, 540 U.S. 398.  
 11. See Eleanor M. Fox, The Efficiency Paradox, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL 
OVERSHOT THE MARK:  THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. 
ANTITRUST 77 (Robert Pitofsky ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2008). 
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CONCLUSION 
The goals debate is not only (usually) unhinged to history and political 
economy but it has obscured the real debate, which is about how to achieve 
robust markets. 
The exercise of debating goals of U.S. antitrust, while provocative and 
interesting, obscures the two data points that actually drive the debate on 
most applications of antitrust law—perspective and assumptions. 
It may be more productive to state the goals or essence of American 
antitrust at a level of generality, as did the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission in its 2007 Report—antitrust is for competition and 
consumers12—and to proceed to examine particular categories of conduct 
and to debate what the rules and standards should be.  This enterprise is no 
less contentious, but it is more straightforward and pragmatic.  Moreover, it 
quickly reveals what the core debate is about:  perspective and assumptions, 
not goals. 
 
 12. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2–3 (2007). 
